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Abstract
We examine the eﬀect of medical marijuana laws (MML) on crime treating the introduc-
tion of MML as a quasi-experiment and using three diﬀerent data sources. First, using
data from the Uniform Crime Reports, we ﬁnd that violent crimes such as homicides and
robberies decrease in states that border Mexico after MML are introduced. Second, using
Supplementary Homicide Reports' data we show that for homicides the decrease is the
result of a drop in drug-law and juvenile-gang related homicides. Lastly, using STRIDE
data, we show that the introduction of MML in Mexican border states decreases the
amount of cocaine seized, while it increases the price of cocaine. Our results are consis-
tent with the theory that decriminalization of small-scale production and distribution of
marijuana harms Mexican drug traﬃcking organizations, whose revenues are highly re-
liant on marijuana sales. The drop in drug-related crimes suggests that the introduction
of MML in Mexican border states lead to a decrease in their activity in those states. Our
results survive a large variety of robustness checks. Extrapolating from our results, this
indicates that decriminalization of the production and distribution of drugs may lead to
a drop in violence in markets where organized crime is pushed out by licit competition.
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Michael Braun, the former chief of operations for the D.E.A., told me a story
about the construction of a high-tech fence along a stretch of border in Arizona.
"They erect this fence," he said, "only to go out there a few days later and dis-
cover that these guys have a catapult, and they're ﬂinging hundred-pound bales of
marijuana over to the other side." He paused and looked at me for a second. "A
catapult," he repeated. "We've got the best fence money can buy, and they counter
us with a 2,500-year-old technology." New York Times, Keefe (2012)
1 Introduction
Most illicit drugs in the US are supplied through Mexico and every year around 6 billion dollars
ﬁnd their way back across the border as proﬁt for the large drug traﬃcking organizations
(DTOs) (Kilmer et al., 2014). DTOs are major contributors to crime in US border states.
They are often allied to local gangs and the smuggling of illicit drugs is known to be paired
with violence as DTOs are willing to protect their products with lethal force (National Gang
Intelligence Center NGIC, 2011). Possibly as a result, Mexican border states have a 15 percent
higher crime rate than inland states. As such, it is no surprise that US law enforcement has
focused a large part of its eﬀorts and resources on deterring DTOs from importing their drugs
into the US. A prime example of this is given in the quote on the top of this page. Yet, as the
quote indicates, even the most advanced techniques are easily avoided by the Mexican drug
traﬃckers. In practice, US eﬀorts to curb the import through Mexico seem to have a limited
impact on the supply of drugs and crime in the US.
In this paper we argue that a diﬀerent strategy may be more eﬀective at decreasing the
role of Mexican DTOs in US crime. Medical marijuana laws (MML) have been introduced
in more than twenty states across the US. These laws allow the consumption and production
of marijuana for medical purposes. In most states medical purposes can range from severe
conditions such as cancers to milder conditions such as (perceived) headaches or back pain.
They de facto decriminalize small-scale production of marijuana, when the drug is intended
for personal use, or for sale in a marijuana dispensary.1
We argue that the main diﬀerence between states with and without MML is not the
availability of marijuana but the origin of the drug. Many studies show marijuana is widely
available in states without MML in place (E.g. National Drug Threat Assessment Report
NDIC, 2011, Kilmer et al., 2014). While marijuana markets were traditionally ﬁrmly in the
hands of Mexican DTOs, according to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment Report
(NDIC, 2011), US production of marijuana has increased more than twofold in the period
2005-2009.2
This increase in local production of marijuana in MML states decreases the market share
of Mexican DTOs in the largest drug market in the US. Therefore, MML provide a quasi-
experimental variation where the increased drug production within the US hurts the proﬁts
of DTOs, in diﬀerent states and at diﬀerent points in time. If MML are indeed eﬀective at
decreasing the activity of these drug traﬃckers, we should see that MML lead to a decrease
in crimes committed by DTOs and their aﬃliated gangs within MML states. Since DTOs
and their aﬃliated gangs conduct most of their criminal activity in Mexican-border states, it
follows that the introduction of MML should reduce drug-related crime and drug traﬃcking
particularly in those states.
1A dispensary is a specialty store that sells marijuana products to patients with a prescription.
2We consider this estimate a lower bound, since production is measured as plants eradicated by law enforce-
ment, while many farms are protected from eradication by MML.
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Several articles in popular media suggest that MML and the later legalization of marijuana
in Colorado and Washington indeed aﬀect the activity of Mexican DTOs (e.g. articles from
the Washington and Huﬃngton Post Khazan, 2012, Miroﬀ, 2014,Knafo, 2014). Price data also
indicates that MML has had a negative impact on Mexican DTOs. The quality-adjusted price
of marijuana has decreased by 6 percent in the period 2009-2012 (UNODC, 2014). However,
to our knowledge a statistical analysis linking MML to criminal activity of Mexican DTOs
within the US is still lacking.
To test our theory we use crime data from 2 diﬀerent sources. First, we use the Uniform
Crime Report (UCR) data which records felony crime rates for all US states. UCR is a panel
data set with violent and property crime rates for each state, split into seven crime categories.
Second, we use the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) data. SHR gives information on
the circumstances surrounding homicides committed in the US. As such, we can see whether
homicides are related to drug violence. Both data sets cover the time period 1990-2012.
Our methodology is a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis where we divide states into three
groups: i.) a treatment group of states with MML at the Mexican border, which is our main
treatment group of interest ii.) a treatment group of inland states with MML, and iii.) a
control group of states without MML. In addition, we include multiple control variables as
well as state-speciﬁc linear time trends, that control for observed and unobserved time-variant
heterogeneity between states.
Our results on the UCR data indicate that there is no signiﬁcant relationship between the
introduction of MML and crime. This conﬁrms earlier analysis in Morris et al. (2014) and
Alford (2014). However, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship between MML and crime
in states that border Mexico. In particular, we show that in those states the violent crime
rates decrease signiﬁcantly. Our central estimate suggest that violent crime decreases by a
little less than 6 percent, with the strongest eﬀects on robberies and homicides which decrease
by 14 and 12 percent, respectively. The geographical heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀect
suggests that the decrease in crime in states that border Mexico may have had something to
do with the activity of DTOs.
Moreover, a further split-up in homicides applying SHR data shows that MML decrease
drug-law and juvenile-gang-related homicides by 48, and 33 percent, respectively. This split-up
strongly suggests that MML decreases homicides related to drugs and gang activity. Although
the decrease in drug and gang violence could potentially be unrelated to the role of Mexican
DTOs, we consider it highly unlikely, since prior to MML virtually all drugs were distributed
by Mexican DTOs, and a large number of gangs within Mexican border states hold direct
alliances with Mexican DTOs (e.g. NDIC, 2011,NGIC, 2011).
In order to look closer into the drug market we use a third data source: the System to
Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) from the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA). This data records narcotic seizures and prices of drugs, thereby allowing us to
investigate the eﬀect of MML on the market for illicit drugs. We exclude marijuana from our
analysis, since MML may have a mechanical eﬀect on the seizures of marijuana. The STRIDE
data cover the period 1990-2007.
Using STRIDE data we ﬁnd that MML decrease the amount of (crack and powdered)
cocaine seized in states bordering Mexico. Our central estimate suggests the amount seized
decreases signiﬁcantly by 85 percent for powdered cocaine, and 83 percent for crack cocaine,
although standard errors are very large. In addition, the price of powdered cocaine increases
signiﬁcantly at all distribution levels. These estimates indicate that MML in Mexican border
states coincides with a negative supply shock. This gives further support to our theory that
MML aﬀect the overall activities of DTOs in border states, and furthermore, suggests that
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the supply of marijuana is complementary to the supply of other drugs, most prominently
cocaine.3
We perform several robustness checks to conﬁrm our results. Most notably, MML in
Mexican border states appear to have a negative eﬀect on property crime. However, placebo
tests indicate that the estimated treatment eﬀect is biased downward (more negative) due to
heterogeneity in crime trends between treatment and control states. As such, it is unclear
whether the estimated eﬀect is indeed (entirely) the result of the MML treatment eﬀect. No
such conﬂict arose with a similar placebo test for violent crimes. Beside this test, we study
the eﬀect of heterogeneity in MML between states. In particular, Pacula et al. (forthcoming)
and Alford (2014) note that there may be a diﬀerence between MML that only allow for
home cultivation and MML that allow for marijuana dispensaries. This would be a concern, if
diﬀerences in the speciﬁc allowances of MML are correlated with their geographical proximity
to the border as this would contaminate our results. However, we ﬁnd that as we control for
diﬀerences in MML, the eﬀect of MML on crime at the Mexican border remains. We ﬁnd that
violent crime at the Mexican border is unaﬀected by MML that allow for home cultivation,
but opening the ﬁrst licensed dispensary has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on crime, although
we should note that the identiﬁcation of the latter eﬀect is weak since most states with MML
open their ﬁrst licensed dispensary one or two years after the adoption of MML.
We also consider the dynamic eﬀect of MML by including lags of the treatment variable in
our regression analysis. We ﬁnd that the lagged coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for violent crime.
This may indicate that the full eﬀect of MML on activity of Mexican DTOs may only appear
in crime rates after a few years.
Our research is of importance to policy makers who consider legalizing or decriminalizing
marijuana production in their jurisdiction. The results presented in this paper indicate that
MML has a negligible direct impact on crime. However, they decrease crime indirectly by
aﬀecting the position of violent Mexican DTOs, and their aﬃliated gangs. We expect even
stronger eﬀects of full legalization of marijuana production, since this will allow for large-scale
production by corporations, likely pushing the DTOs completely out of the proﬁtable market
for marijuana. Thus, legalization might prove to be a way to diminish the power of organized
crime structures. Of course, in its decision to legalize marijuana the government should weigh
these beneﬁts against the relevant costs related to marijuana legalization.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section discusses related
literature. The third section provides a theoretical link between MML and crime. The fourth
section describes the data while the ﬁfth section discusses methodology and the results. The
sixth section presents robustness checks. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Related Literature
MML have recently become a popular instrument for a variety of societal issues related to
drug consumption, including crime (See e.g. Anderson et al., 2013; Chu, 2012, 2013; Pacula et
al., forthcoming; Morris et al., 2014; Alford, 2014). Most related to our study are Morris et al.
(2014), and Alford (2014) which investigate the relationship between MML and crime. Morris
et al. (2014) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between MML and crime, with the exception of
3Note that one would expect a stronger eﬀect on cocaine than on other drugs. First, cocaine is the second-
largest drug market after marijuana. Second, Mexican DTOs have apparently replaced some of their marijuana
ﬁelds with opium ﬁelds (e.g. Miroﬀ, 2014), suggesting less complementarity between marijuana and opium-
related drugs such as heroin. Third, synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine are usually produced within the
US, and as such have a clear alternative distribution channels that are unrelated to the supply of marijuana.
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homicides for which the relationship with MML is signiﬁcantly negative. We conﬁrm this
ﬁnding, but we also show that there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between MML and
crime in the Mexico border region.
Alford (2014) studies the eﬀect of speciﬁc MML characteristics on crime. In particular, she
ﬁnds that MML which allow for dispensaries have a positive eﬀect on both violent and property
crimes. We partly replicate this result at the Mexican border. We show that crime is negatively
related to home cultivation, but positively related to the state-wide allowance of dispensaries.
However, in some states, including the largest MML state California, many counties licensed
dispensaries prior to their state-wide allowance (see also the discussion in Anderson and Rees,
2014). When we consider the opening date of the ﬁrst licensed dispensary, we ﬁnd that home
cultivation has a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect on crime, while dispensaries have a negative eﬀect on
violent crime in Mexican border states. Identiﬁcation of the additional eﬀect of dispensaries
is weak, since the ﬁrst licensed dispensary usually opens 1 or 2 years after the introduction
of MML. However, this evidence suggests that the opening of dispensaries does not increase
crime.
There has also been some evidence of the eﬀect of the decriminalization of marijuana pos-
session on crime abroad. In particular, Adda et al. (2014) looks at the eﬀect of depenalization
on crime in a London borough. They ﬁnd that overall crime fell, while possession oﬀenses
increased and persisted even after the policy ended. In another UK quasi-experiment, Braak-
man and Jones (forthcoming) ﬁnd no eﬀect of the 2004 decriminalization in the UK on crime
and drug consumption. Unlike MML the decriminalization in the UK had no eﬀect on the
legal status of marijuana production which remained strictly illegal throughout the policy
experiment.
The market for marijuana is strongly interlinked with the market for other illicit drugs.
It is often argued that marijuana is a complement to the demand of other drugs, in a theory
often known as the gateway drug hypothesis. According to the theory, after consumption of
marijuana users are more likely to consume habitually other illicit drugs and, thus, marijuana
acts as the gateway drug. However, empirical evidence is mixed, with some papers ﬁnding
that consumption of marijuana causally increases the demand for other drugs (e.g. DeSimone,
1998; Ramful and Zhao, 2009), while others ﬁnd no eﬀect (e.g. Van Ours, 2003; Morral et al.,
2002; Chu, 2013), and some even indicating that marijuana is a substitute to the consumption
of other drugs(e.g. Model, 1993). Chu (2013) uses MML to test the gateway drug hypothesis
and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of MML on the arrests for possession of other drugs. Moreover,
using substance treatment admission data, he rather ﬁnds that MML may decrease heroin
treatment admissions. We add to this literature by arguing that marijuana may also be a
complement to the supply of other drugs. In particular, we show that MML lead to a negative
supply shock of other illicit drugs. As such, empirical tests for the gateway hypothesis should
take into account that illicit drug markets are interlinked both in demand and in supply.
In addition to the relationship between marijuana and other illicit drugs, there is another
strand of the literature which examines the complementarity in demand between marijuana
and alcohol use. Anderson et al. (2013) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of MML on alcohol-
related accidents and survey-reported alcohol use. Both results indicate that marijuana and
alcohol are demand substitutes. This ﬁnding corresponds with earlier results in DiNardo and
Lemieux (2001) who show that an increase in the drinking age increases marijuana consump-
tion. On the other hand, Pacula (1998) shows that marijuana consumption decreases with the
beer tax, indicating that the two goods are complements. Additionally, the results of Anderson
et al. (2013) could not be replicated in Pacula et al. (forthcoming) using various other survey
measures of alcohol use. We add indirectly by studying the degree of complementarity in de-
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mand between alcohol and marijuana through the eﬀect of MML on alcohol-related homicides.
With our data we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship, although we should add that this may
be due to the relatively small number of alcohol-related homicides.
3 Background
In this section we introduce the main theoretical framework linking MML to the supply and
demand of illicit drugs and the crime rate. First, we describe the legal impact of MML on
marijuana consumption and production. Second, we explain the link between MML, DTOs
and the demand and supply of illicit drugs.
3.1 Legal Impact of MML
Prior to MML marijuana was strictly prohibited in some states and decriminalized in other
states in a policy that typically dates back to the 1970's.4 If the drug was prohibited, this
meant that even possession and use of small quantities of marijuana could lead to punishment
in jail. If the drug was decriminalized this meant that the penalty for possession of small
quantities was limited to a small ﬁne. In either case, prior to MML no state allowed for any
form of production or distribution of the drug.
When a state introduces an MML it allows patients to consume marijuana for medicinal
purposes. The most important of these purposes is pain reduction, and most states with
MML allow doctors to prescribe marijuana as a pain killer for general complaints related to
pain, such as migraines and back pain. Since it is diﬃcult for the doctor to verify whether
pain complaints are real, MML de facto make marijuana legally available for a large group of
`patients'.
Patients with a prescription for marijuana can generally obtain the drug in two ways. First,
they are allowed to grow a limited number of plants in their own homes. Second, in some states
patients can obtain marijuana from marijuana dispensaries.5
If dispensaries are allowed they are typically organized as co-operative associations (collec-
tives). Members of the collective can either be producers, consumers or both. If a dispensary
has x patients, the producers of the dispensary are on aggregate allowed to grow x times
the number of plants allowed for a single patient. In some states/counties producers can be
a member of multiple dispensaries allowing them to scale up their production substantially,
but in other states/counties this is not allowed. In some states MML do not explicitly allow
or disallow dispensaries. In those states dispensaries may receive a license from the county.
Overall, even though farmers run the risk of federal prosecution, and legislation diﬀers be-
tween states, it is clear that MML signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of imprisonment for
small-scale marijuana farmers.
In ﬁgure 1 we present a map of the United States, where states with MML are shaded.
Most relevant for our study is the Mexican border region. As can be seen, in this region all
states except Texas have adopted an MML.
Table 1 presents an overview of the MML. As can be seen, most states with MML allow for
home cultivation from the moment the MML becomes eﬀective. However, many states did not
4Nevada in 2002 and Massachusetts in 2008 are the only states that decriminalized marijuana during the
time span we study in this paper. We control for decriminalization in Nevada and Massachusetts in our analysis.
5While MML are state policies, at the federal level all usage, sales and production of marijuana are felony
oﬀenses subject to imprisonment. However, in the US the large majority of law enforcement is employed at
the state or county level. As such, the risk of federal prosecution is relatively small for small-scale operations.
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Table 1: Medical Marijuana Laws
State Date Active Home Dispensaries Dispensaries
Cultivation Open
Alaska 04.03.1999 Yes No No
Arizona 14.12.2010 Yes Yes 2012a
California 06.11.1996 Yes 2004 1997b
Colorado 01.06.2001 Yes 2009 2009a
Connecticut 01.10.2012 No No No
DC 27.07.2010 No Yes No
Delaware 01.07.2011 No Yes No
Hawaii 28.12.2000 No No No
Maine 22.12.1999 Yes 2009 2011a
Michigan 04.12.2008 Yes No 2010a
Montana 02.11.2004 Yes No 2009a
Nevada 01.10.2001 Yes No 2011a
New Jersey 18.07.2010 No Yes 2012a
New Mexico 01.07.2007 Yes Yes 2009c
Oregon 03.12.1998 Yes No 2010a
Rhode Island 03.01.2006 Yes 2009 No
Vermont 01.07.2004 Yes 2011 No
Washington 03.11.1998 Yes No 2010a
Notes: The table presents MML and their speciﬁc provisions up to the year 2012.
The second column presents the date the law became active, the third column shows
whether there is a statewide allowance for home cultivation, the fourth column gives
the same information about dispensaries, and the last column shows the date when the
ﬁrst licensed dispensary opened. "No" means that the original MML does not allow
for the feature in question, while "Yes" means the contrary. Whenever some feature
is allowed in a later amendment to original law the year is given. For example, in
California MML became active in 1996. Home cultivation was immediately allowed,
while dispensaries were not allowed statewide until 2004. 1997 is the date in which the
ﬁrst licensed dispensary opened. All information except the ﬁnal column comes from
procon.org.
a Source: Anderson and Rees (2014)
b Source: Novack (2012)
c Source: DEA (2013)
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Figure 1: Map of Medical Marijuana Laws
Notes: This graph shows the states in which MML have been introduced. Not shown are Alaska and Hawaii,
which have also introduced MML. Dark shade corresponds to states that have introduced MML until the end
of 2012, while light shaded are state that have introduced MML after the beginning of 2013.
immediately allow for dispensaries at the moment of adoption of MML. For example, California
endorsed an MML in 1996, but only amended the law to speciﬁcally allow for dispensaries in
2004. Regulations concerning dispensaries vary by state and even by county basis. The most
interesting case in this respect is California. In California the ﬁrst unlicensed dispensary
opened in 1992, 4 years prior to the adoption of the MML. In 1997, the ﬁrst county-licensed
dispensary was opened and the state was documented to have at least 55 dispensaries by 2003,
1 year prior to explicit statewide allowance for dispensaries (Gieringer, 2003). Moreover, some
states allow for dispensaries but do not have one, or saw the ﬁrst one opening some years
after the speciﬁc allowance. Therefore, we have added a column to the table with the date in
which the state ﬁrst opened a licensed dispensary. These dates are partly the result of work
by Anderson and Rees (2014) and of a report by DEA (2013) which documents the opening
of dispensaries for some states. In the case of California these sources could not conﬁrm the
ﬁrst opening of a licensed dispensary. Therefore, we conducted a Google search to see when
the state opened its ﬁrst licensed dispensary. Several sources, among which Novack (2012),
conﬁrmed that the ﬁrst licensed dispensary opened in 1997 in San Francisco.
MML appear to have increased the supply and demand of both legal (medical), and illegal
marijuana within the US. Turning ﬁrst to demand, Pacula et al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd that MML
lead to an increase in self-reported use of marijuana. Chu (2012) shows there is a positive
relationship between MML and marijuana-related arrests, indicating that when MML are in
place, illegal demand for marijuana increases. Although we are not aware of a similar study
in the US, Walsh et al. (2013) shows that MML in Canada also substantially increase the
demand for (legal) medical marijuana.
On the supply side NDIC (2011) shows that the illegal production of marijuana within
the US as measured by plants eradicated has increased twofold in the period 2005-2009.6 To
our knowledge no data is available on the growth in production of (legal) medical marijuana,
but given the large number of dispensaries on, for example, the popular website http://www.
6The increase in illegal marijuana production may be explained by the fact that law enforcement agencies
within MML states do not have the means to distinguish between medical and illegally grown marijuana.
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weedmaps.org, it appears as if legal production covers a large part of the marijuana market.
Overall it appears that production of marijuana within the US has grown faster than
demand. Kilmer et al. (2014) show that demand has grown, by a pace of 46 percent in the
period 2005-2009, while the data in NDIC (2011) indicate that illegal production alone has
grown by more than a 100 percent. As such, MML have very likely lead to a drop in market
share of the Mexican DTOs.
3.2 DTOs, Drugs and Crime
In Mexico there are 7 major DTOs that control almost all the drug trade between Mexico and
the US (NDIC, 2011). Through most of our sample the Tijuana Cartel, located on the Mexican
West-Coast, is the largest DTO. However, in recent years this cartel is falling into decay, and
the Sinola Cartel located in the center of Mexico has replaced its role as Mexico's largest
drug cartel. Sinola's annual revenue is estimated at 3 billion US dollar (Fortune Magazine
Matthews, 2014).
The main activity of Mexican DTOs is drug distribution. Within Mexico DTOs are strictly
geographically separated, and each controls its own territory and smuggling routes into the US.
Once the drugs enter the US, DTOs sell their drugs to aﬃliated gangs. The aﬃliated gangs
each have a presence in at least one of the four Mexican border states. This likely indicates
that representatives of the DTOs do not often venture farther North than the border states.7
The aﬃliated gangs distribute the drugs further into the US (NGIC, 2011; NDIC, 2011).
DTOs and their aﬃliated gangs are well-known for their contribution to violent crime along
the Mexican border. In particular, they have been known to engage in kidnapping, assaults,
robberies and homicides in Mexico and in the US (NGIC, 2011; NDIC, 2011). Perhaps as a
result, crime rates in states on the Mexican border are 15 percent higher than in inland states.
Drugs sold by the DTOs can be roughly categorized into four categories: marijuana, co-
caine, opium-based drugs of which heroin is the most important, and synthetic drugs, most
prominently methamphetamine. All DTOs are diversiﬁed and sell a range of these drug prod-
ucts. This diversiﬁcation strategy is likely optimal, since DTOs and their owners do not have
access to capital markets. Diversiﬁcation allows drug kingpins to smooth their consumption.
Moreover, retained earnings of one drug can be used to pay investment cost on other drugs.
In this respect, marijuana plays a special role. Heroin and other opium-related drugs are
usually imported from South-America or Asia. Mexico has recently increased its production of
poppy plants (UNODC, 2010, 2014), from which heroin is produced, but even locally produced
poppy has to go through laboratory reﬁnement in order to create heroin. Cocaine has to be
purchased from Columbian DTOs. Production of synthetics requires laboratory equipment.
As such, production of each of these drugs, in particular at the large scale required for the
DTOs, requires major investment. On the other hand, marijuana can be grown in Mexico
with almost zero up-front cost, and it is the largest drug market in the US. Finally, prior to
MML Mexico had a virtual monopoly on marijuana in the sense that they were by far the
largest producer of marijuana in North America (UNODC, 2010, 2014). Therefore, marijuana
is probably a major cash crop for the DTOs. As such, it is likely that proceeds of marijuana
are used for investment in the other drugs8.
If MML introduced in a state on the Mexican border causes the state to produce more
marijuana this can have severe repercussions on DTOs and their aﬃliated gangs. Smuggling
7We have established this by cross-checking the list of gangs allied to Mexican DTOs with the list of gangs
that are active in each state in NGIC (2011).
8This has also been asserted in several media articles, e.g. Keefe (2012)
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routes to the state decrease in value as both the demand and the price for one of the major
drugs falls. Moreover, the DTOs may have less cash available to invest in the other drugs.
Therefore, in the medium to long run we expect a (partial) retreat of DTOs from states with
MML at the Mexican border. This leads to a decrease in crimes committed by the DTOs, as
well as a decrease in the supply of illicit drugs in the state.
Anecdotal evidence supporting this theory is the demise of the Tijuana cartel. The main
smuggling routes for the Tijuana cartel lead to California which was the ﬁrst state to introduce
MML in 1996. Part of the demise of this cartel may therefore be explained by MML in
California.9 In addition, articles in popular media suggest that locally produced marijuana is
aﬀecting the proﬁts and activities of DTOs as discussed in the introduction.
We can study this theory in more detail using crime data. In particular, if MML aﬀect
crime through their eﬀect on DTOs we would expect that the treatment eﬀect of MML on
crime is stronger (more negative) in Mexican border states than in inland states. Moreover,
we would expect that the strongest decrease occurs in drug - and gang-related crimes such as
homicides, assaults and robberies. In addition, whenever the circumstances behind the crime
can be established, we expect those circumstances to be related to drugs or gangs.
The theory also predicts a decrease in overall supply of drugs from Mexico. Hence, we
can use drug data to establish whether MML decrease drug seizures, excluding marijuana
seizures, in Mexican border states, and whether they increase their market price. Therefore,
in the remainder of our paper we aim to establish whether MML have decreased crime and
drug smuggling in Mexican border states. Moreover, we establish the circumstances behind
the drop in crime in Mexican border states when possible.
3.3 Alternative Theories
MML may have also aﬀected crime through diﬀerent channels. Goldstein (1985) discusses
three main channels through which drugs can aﬀect criminal activity. First, through the
`pharmacological channel drugs may increase aggression, and therefore, violent crime. Second,
there is an `economic channel' in that drug users may resort to crime in order to ﬁnance
their drug habit. Finally, there may be `systemic channel' because drug contracts cannot be
enforced in the courts, and hence, disputes between drug market participants are often solved
with violence.
Moreover, according to the drug gateway hypothesis, after consumption of marijuana users
are more likely to consume habitually other illicit drugs and, thus, marijuana acts as a gateway
drug. If this is the case MML may have increased the demand for other drugs.10
However, unlike the DTO channel, these alternative channels do not have a clear geograph-
ical dimension. For example, if MML increase the demand for heroin through the gateway drug
hypothesis, we would expect this to occur in both New Mexico, and Washington.11 However,
when the drop in crime is speciﬁc to Mexican-border states, DTOs are the most likely channel.
9Other factors have also contributed to the demise of the Tijuana cartel. In particular, Mexican law
enforcement started a campaign against the DTO in 2006. In one of our robustness checks we control for this
increase in law enforcement to see if the drop in crime is not (in part) the result of increased law enforcement
in Mexico. We ﬁnd that this is not the case.
10 Evidence on the gateway drug hypothesis is mixed with some papers ﬁnding that consumption of marijuana
increases the demand for other drugs (e.g. DeSimone, 1998; Ramful and Zhao, 2009), while others ﬁnd no eﬀect
(e.g. Van Ours, 2003; Morral et al., 2002; Chu, 2013), and some even indicating that marijuana is a substitute
to the consumption of other drugs(e.g. Model, 1993).
11Of course, this only holds under the assumption that New Mexico and Washington introduce MML with
similar provisions. Therefore, in our robustness analysis we also pay attention to the speciﬁc provisions of
MML in each state.
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4 Data Description
We use three diﬀerent data sets to test the eﬀect of MML on crime in Mexican border states.
First, we use UCR data (1990-2012) for data on overall crime rates. Second, we use SHR data
(1990-2012), which allows us to examine the homicides by circumstances. Lastly, STRIDE data
(1990-2007) on illicit drug seizures and price allows us to examine the relationship between
MML and illicit drug markets. In this section we describe each of our datasets in turn.
4.1 Uniform Crime Reports
All local US law enforcement agencies collect data on reported crimes. Summaries of this
data are submitted to the FBI and reported as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The
data include the number of violent and property crimes reported per year in each state per
100,000 inhabitants. Violent crime is subdivided in the following categories: homicide, robbery,
aggravated assault, and forcible rape. Property crime is subdivided in burglary, larceny theft,
and motor vehicle theft. Unfortunately, not all crime types are reported in the UCR data.
Among others, UCR data does not contain information about crimes that are often linked
to criminal organizations in general (and Mexican DTOs speciﬁcally) such as, drug crimes,
kidnapping, human traﬃcking, (credit card) fraud, and extortion. With respect to drug crimes,
we try to circumvent this by using the STRIDE data described below. Unfortunately, to our
knowledge no common data source exists for the other crimes, and as a result we exclude them
from our analysis. Table 2 presents summary statistics.
4.2 Supplementary Homicide Reports
The Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) data provide incident level information of a
homicide, as reported by the UCR agencies, and collected by the FBI. The data include
information of the relationship between a victim and an oﬀender, demographic characteristics
of both the victim and oﬀender, types of weapon used and circumstances behind the homicide.
Of particular interest for our study are the circumstances. The SHR data classify circumstances
behind homicides into 21 categories of which the following ﬁve (9 percent of the homicides in
the SHR) are related to our study: drug law (3.9 %), juvenile gang (1.5 %), gangland (0.9 %),
homicides committed under the inﬂuence of drugs (0.7 %) and homicides committed under the
inﬂuence of alcohol (2 %). Drug law homicides are homicides that are related to a violation
of narcotic drug laws (e.g. drug traﬃcking or manufacturing), juvenile gang homicides are
homicides that are related to a juvenile gang, gangland homicides are all homicides related to
organized crime (except juvenile gangs), and the other two categories speak for themselves.
Whenever a homicide may fall under multiple categories, for example an organized crime
related homicide committed under the inﬂuence of drugs, it is only reported under the more
serious oﬀense.
4.3 STRIDE Data
Data on the drug market come from the STRIDE dataset provided by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). STRIDE data records seizures and (undercover) purchases of drugs
by law enforcement oﬃcers. It provides rich information including the number of seizures, the
quantity seized and the price for each purchase. Drugs are divided in 5 categories: marijuana,
powdered cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin. For the purpose of this study
we ignore marijuana, since MML may have a mechanical eﬀect on the seizures of marijuana.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Dataset Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs
A. UCRa Overall Violent Crime 477.74 305.97 65.35 2921.80 1173
Homicide 6.23 7.19 0.16 80.60 1173
Robbery 135.73 135.11 6.40 1266.38 1173
Aggravated Assault 300.17 179.92 34.09 1557.61 1173
Forcible Rape 35.51 12.74 11.15 98.64 1173
Overall Property Crime 3765.25 1153.51 1619.61 9512.09 1173
Burglary 806.57 308.42 296.46 2170.61 1173
Larceny Theft 2578.17 730.42 1188.87 5833.75 1173
Motor Vehicle Theft 380.59 244.48 69.49 1839.89 1173
B. SHRa Drug Law 0.29 1.14 0 24.41 1130
Juvenile Gang 0.09 0.29 0 2.66 1130
Gangland 0.04 0.08 0 0.75 1130
Under the Inﬂuence of Alcohol 0.09 0.15 0 1.26 1130
Under the Inﬂuence of Drugs 0.04 0.08 0 0.99 1130
C. STRIDE
Quantity Powder Cocaine 1201240 4488958 0 61600000 898
Crack Cocaine 259573.4 1073935 0 18300000 898
Methamphetamine 128577 492704.5 0 7804662 898
Heroin 145400.9 586064.2 0 9332651 898
Bust Count Powder Cocaine 130.40 180.94 0 1280 898
Crack Cocaine 175.81 485.17 0 5418 898
Methamphetamine 70.99 159.14 0 1578 898
Heroin 91.90 172.01 0 1268 898
Price by Powder Cocaine Street Level 615.23 650.94 25.28 2884.74 600
distribution levelsb Powder Cocaine Low Distribution 205.94 272.93 8.73 2125.78 683
Powder Cocaine High Distribution 61.35 73.81 3.53 1683.39 789
Powder Cocaine Wholesale 33.07 13.62 2.01 85.82 746
Crack Cocaine Street Level 487.37 529.61 17.44 2828.28 603
Crack Cocaine Low Distribution 129.89 133.92 6.93 1504.50 724
Crack Cocaine Wholesale 38.61 16.48 2.16 110.07 717
Methamphetamine Street Level 375.19 434.46 3.54 2952.32 535
Methamphetamine Low Distribution 75.42 71.40 2.22 969.65 573
Methamphetamine Wholesale 25.13 26.09 2.07 321.18 422
Heroin Street Level 957.58 1235.31 8.05 9266.34 537
Heroin Low Distribution 396.02 623.06 10.33 7305.00 576
Heroin Wholesale 113.66 84.62 8.10 746.04 592
D. Treatment Variables MML 0.14 0.34 0 1 1173
MML at Mexico Border 0.02 0.15 0 1 1173
MML Rest 0.11 0.32 0 1 1173
Home Cultivation Mexico Border 0.02 0.15 0 1 1173
Home Cultivation Rest 0.11 0.31 0 1 1173
Dispensary Legalization Mexico Border 0.02 0.12 0 1 1173
Dispensary Legalization Rest 0.02 0.14 0 1 1173
Dispensary Operating Mexico Border 0.02 0.13 0 1 1173
Dispensary Operating Rest 0.02 0.14 0 1 1173
E. Control variables Male Ratio 0.49 0.01 0.47 0.53 1173
Portion of African American 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.65 1173
Portion of Hispanics 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.47 1173
Portion of Age 15-24 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.20 1173
Portion of Age 25-34 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.22 1173
Unemployment Rate 5.66 1.90 2.30 13.80 1173
Income per capita (log) 10.26 0.30 9.48 11.22 1173
Decriminalization Laws 0.23 0.42 0 1 1173
The table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the estimation of the results. The ﬁrst super row present statistics from
the Uniform Crime Reports dataset, the second super row presents statistics from the Supplementary Homicide Reports dataset, the third
super row present statistics from the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence dataset. The fourth super row presents our MML
independent variables, while the last super row presents the control variables.
a All UCR and SHR crime statistics are measured as the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
b Powdered cocaine quantities smaller than 2 grams are classiﬁed as street level, quantities between 2 and 10 grams are low distribution level,
quantities between 10 and 50 gram are high distribution level, and quantities larger than 50 are considered wholesale level. For crack cocaine
quantities smaller than 1 gram are street level, quantities between 1 and 15 gram are distribution level and quantities greater than 15 are
wholesale level. For methamphetamine quantities smaller than 0.1 gram are excluded, quantities between 0.1 and 10 gram are considered
street level, quantities between 10 and 100 grams are distribution level and quantities greater than 100 grams are wholesale level. For heroin
quantities quantities smaller than 0.1 gram are excluded, quantities between 0.1 and 1 gram are considered retail level, quantities between 1
and 10 grams are distribution level and quantities greater than 10 grams are wholesale level.
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Our STRIDE data runs from 1990 up to 2007, since the data is only released several years
after analysis. STRIDE data only provides information on samples of drugs which are send
to the DEA lab for analysis. Unfortunately, not all drugs seized in the US are sent to the
DEA lab. As such, STRIDE data does not contain information on all drug seizures in the US,
and the sample may not be representative for drug seizures in the country. With regard to
the amount of seizures and the quantity seized this issue will not bias our result unless the
measurement error is correlated to the introduction of MML which we consider unlikely.
However, issues with the price data have been well established in the literature (Arkes et
al., 2008). First, we adjust for inﬂation and report all prices in 1990 US dollars. Second, the
data contains some outliers which are likely the result of a mistake at data entry. Therefore,
for powdered and crack cocaine, and methamphetamine, prices per gram less than $2 as well
as more than $3000 are excluded. For heroin, prices per gram less than $7.5 and more than
$ 10000 are excluded. Third, for some years some states report zero seizures to the DEA.
We consider it unlikely that a state has zero drug seizures during a year and therefore treat
these zeros as missing observations. Our results are not qualitatively aﬀected if we use zeros
instead of missing values. Finally, the price of drugs diﬀers signiﬁcantly by the distribution
level at which the drugs are purchased. Drugs purchased at the wholesale level tend to be
cheaper than the same drug sampled at the retail (street) level for the simple reason that each
distribution level takes a proﬁt margin. Hence, a comparison of price data between states and
over time is not possible unless we classify the price by the distribution level at which the
drug is seized. We follow the recommendations given in Arkes et al. (2008). In particular,
we distinguish between small seizures which are likely the result of seizures at the retail level,
medium seizures which we classify as distribution level seizures, and large seizures which we
classify as wholesale level seizures. The exact overview of our classiﬁcation as well as summary
statistics are given in table 2. Arkes et al. (2008) show that this classiﬁcation scheme leads to
consistent pattern in price comparison between metropolitan areas and over time.
4.4 MML and Control Variables
Our main independent variable is a dummy variable for introduction of MML. An overview of
the relevant dates and characteristics of each law can be found in table 1 in section 3.1.
Control variables in our analysis come from the following three data sources: National
Cancer Institute, the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. We include as control variables for our analysis the shares in the population
of: males, African Americans, Hispanics, people aged between 15-24 and people aged between
25-34. Furthermore, we add unemployment rates, (log) income per capita and a dummy when
a state decriminalizes marijuana (instead of endorsing an MML). Each of these statistics is
known to correlate with the crime rate (see e.g. Tauchen, 2010). Moreover, we consider it
plausible that these variables may be correlated with the introduction of MML. Therefore, the
estimate of the treatment eﬀect may be biased if we do not control for these variables in our
analysis. Summary statistics are presented in table 2.
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5 Methodology and Results
5.1 Empirical Strategy
We test our theory empirically with a ﬁxed-eﬀect regression of the following form:
ln yst = β
MBDstBs + β
restDst(1−Bs) + αs + γt + νXst +
S∑
s=1
δst+ εst,
where yst is the outcome variable in state s and period t, Dst is the treatment dummy which
takes value zero if a state has not (yet) enacted MML in period t and one in if the state has
enacted an MML, Bs is a dummy which takes value one if a state is located at the Mexican
border and zero otherwise, αs are state-ﬁxed eﬀects, γt are time-ﬁxed eﬀects, Xst is a vector
of control variables, the term
∑S
s=1 δst are state-linear time trends and εst is the error term.
The outcome variables are (logs of) diﬀerent crime rates, drug seizures, and drug prices, such
as the property crime rate, the homicide rate, the number of cocaine seizures or the price of
heroin.
In the regression equation parameter βMB captures the eﬀect of an MML on the outcome
variable in Mexican border states, while βrest measures the eﬀect of an MML in states that
are not located on the Mexican border. Our theory can be tested statistically by establishing
whether the treatment eﬀect, βMB, is signiﬁcantly smaller than zero for the relevant outcome
variables. We estimate our model through population-weighted OLS and cluster the standard
errors at the state level.
In order to get an unbiased estimate of the treatment eﬀect in border states, it is crucial
to choose the correct speciﬁcation. The simplest version of our regression equation without
control variables and state-linear time trends is equivalent to a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
speciﬁcation with two treatment groups, i.) States at the Mexican border with MML, and ii.)
Inland states with MML, and a control group; states without MML. However, the validity of
the standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology depends on whether the outcome variable
in treated and untreated states evolves according to a common trend. The common-trend
assumption may be violated for two reasons.
First, states that introduce an MML may diﬀer from states that do not introduce an MML
in time-variant observable characteristics. This is an issue if the observable characteristic is
correlated to both the crime rate and the presence of MML, since in that case the estimate of
the treatment eﬀect may be biased. To control for time-variant observable characteristics we
add a number of control variables that may be correlated to crime as well as the introduction
of MML in Xst. The control variables are listed in section 4.4.
Second, states in the treatment group may diﬀer from the control group in time-variant
unobservable characteristics. These time-variant characteristics may for example correspond
to time-variant culture or the political climate in a state. To control for this issue we add state-
speciﬁc linear time trends in our main speciﬁcation. These trends terms capture all unobserved
heterogeneity that evolves linearly over time. Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee that all
unobserved heterogeneity evolves linearly over time. Therefore, we assess the robustness of
our main analysis with respect to time-variant heterogeneity through a placebo treatment
which we describe in section 6.
5.2 UCR Results
Table 3 shows our main results. In column 1 we see that a general MML dummy has a non-
signiﬁcant impact on the violent crime rate. This ﬁnding corresponds with results in Morris
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et al. (2014) and Alford (2014). However, columns 2 and 3 show that the eﬀect of MML on
violent crime is signiﬁcantly negative at states bordering Mexico. In the simple diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence model without control variables and linear time trends, the estimate suggest that
the introduction of MML reduces violent crime by approximately 20 percent.12
When we include control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time trends the estimated co-
eﬃcient decreases. This suggests that observed heterogeneity, as well as linearly evolving
unobserved heterogeneity between states bias the coeﬃcient downward. This could be the
case if, for example, states that are more likely to introduce MML are also more likely to
have a downward trend in crime rates. Hence, the model in column 2 may be misspeciﬁed.
However, even after we control for these observables and unobservables, the coeﬃcient is still
signiﬁcantly negative and our preferred speciﬁcation, presented in column 3, suggests that the
introduction of MML decrease the violent crime rate at the Mexican border states by approx-
imately 5.8 percent. The coeﬃcient for non-border states is never signiﬁcant, indicating that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that MML did not aﬀect the violent crime rate in those
states.
Table 3: The Eﬀect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violent Crime Property Crime
MML Mexico Border -0.223*** -0.059*** -0.182*** -0.134***
(0.062) (0.020) (0.038) (0.027)
MML Rest 0.067 0.010 -0.025 0.050**
(0.050) (0.033) (0.034) (0.023)
MML -0.021 -0.033
(0.022) (0.036)
Constant 9.092* 6.513*** 9.516* 9.280** 8.590*** 10.413***
(5.414) (0.044) (5.308) (3.781) (0.039) (3.733)
State ﬁxed eﬀects x x x x x x
Year ﬁxed eﬀects x x x x x x
Control variables x x x x
State speciﬁc trends x x x x
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.980 0.925 0.980 0.972 0.912 0.974
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants
in state s at time t as measured in the UCR data. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the property
crime rate. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The
included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income
per capita, the share of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population.
The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level.
Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
The ﬁndings for the property crime rate are similar to our ﬁndings for the violent crime
12We use the approximation suggested in Kennedy (1981) to interpret the estimated coeﬃcient, c as a semi-
elasticity c. The transformation suggested in the article is: c = exp(c − V (c)) − 1, where c is the estimated
coeﬃcient and V (c) its variance.
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rate. Column 4 shows that MML do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on property crime, again
conﬁrming the ﬁndings in the literature. However, the eﬀect in Mexican border-states is
signiﬁcantly negative. The estimate presented in column 6 suggests that the introduction of
MML decreased property crime at the Mexican border states by approximately 12.6 percent.
On the other hand, the coeﬃcient presented in column 6 for non-border states is signiﬁcantly
positive indicating that MML increased crime at non-border states. This indicates that MML
lead to an increase in property crime in non-border states of about 5.1 percent. However,
both results on property crime have to be interpreted with caution. A placebo test in the next
section shows that the estimated results on property crime are strongly driven by diﬀerences
in crime trends between treatment and control states. In particular, in the placebo test the
positive eﬀect on inland states disappears completely, while the negative eﬀect on crime in
Mexican border states decreases signiﬁcantly. As such, the estimated coeﬃcients are likely an
overestimate of the actual treatment eﬀect.
Table 4: The Eﬀect of MML Split per Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Homicide Robbery Aggravated Forcible Burglary Larceny Motor
Assault Rape Theft Vehicle Theft
MML Mexico Border -0.120** -0.151*** -0.024 0.034 -0.126*** -0.085*** -0.351***
(0.047) (0.034) (0.027) (0.039) (0.031) (0.026) (0.063)
MML Rest -0.046 0.018 -0.006 0.055 0.068*** 0.037** 0.114
(0.035) (0.045) (0.036) (0.035) (0.025) (0.017) (0.075)
Constant -1.268 3.397 10.839 5.094 12.544** 10.133*** 1.494
(7.843) (6.409) (6.893) (5.249) (5.033) (3.561) (6.390)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.951 0.982 0.974 0.961 0.978 0.974 0.971
Note: The dependent variable in each column is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed in the column
header in state s at time t. In the UCR data crimes in column 1-4 are listed as violent crimes, while crimes in column 5-7 are property
crimes. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying
the presented results were all estimated with state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time
trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per
capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the
period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks
denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 4 splits the results of our preferred model with state-linear-time trends and control
variables by detailed crime category. The dependent variable in each column is the log of the
crime rate reported in the column head. As can be seen, MML at the border has a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on the violent crimes homicide and robbery. The eﬀect on aggravated assault
and forcible rape is non-signiﬁcant. For violent crimes our central estimates suggests that
homicides decrease by 11.5 percent and robberies decrease by 14.1 percent. Our estimates
shows that MML decrease property crimes at the border, and increases property crime in
non-border states, but again this result should be interpreted with caution.
The results on violent crime are in line with our theory as outlined in section 3. In
particular, violent crimes such as robbery and homicide, which are linked to both Mexican
DTOs and gangs associated with DTOs, decrease after introduction of MML in the Mexican
border region where we know that DTOs have a strong inﬂuence on the crime rate. Forcible
rape is unaﬀected, and this crime is indeed not commonly associated to systemic drug violence.
More surprising is perhaps the non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of MML on aggravated assaults in Mexican
border states, since assaults are often linked to drug violence. This could for example be
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explained by the fact that victims of drug violence are unlikely to report the crime to the
police.
5.3 Supplementary Homicide Results
Table 5 shows result from the supplementary homicide data. The dependent variable in the
reported regressions is the homicide rate in each category. Unlike in the previous regression, we
do not take the log of the homicide rate, since some states have zero homicides in a particular
category in a particular year.13 As can be seen, the introduction of MML at the Mexican border
signiﬁcantly reduces homicides related to narcotic drug laws, and juvenile gangs. In addition,
there is a signiﬁcant, but smaller, negative eﬀect on juvenile gang killings in non-border states.
Table 5: The Eﬀect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Diﬀerent Types of Homicide: SHR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Drug Juvenile Gangland Under the Inﬂuence of...
Laws Gang Alcohol Drugs
MML at Mexico border -0.172*** -0.564** 0.020 0.014 0.015
(0.057) (0.265) (0.018) (0.026) (0.024)
MML Rest 0.022 -0.047** 0.013 0.022 -0.010
(0.091) (0.021) (0.029) (0.017) (0.026)
Constant 14.909 13.354 1.408 0.443 -3.694
(19.259) (17.062) (2.319) (3.344) (3.861)
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130
R-squared 0.760 0.962 0.436 0.750 0.781
Note: The dependent variable in each column is the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the type
of homicide listed above in state s at time t. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from
the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with
state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time trends. The included
control variables are an indicator for decriminalisation policy, unemployment rate, logged income per
capita, the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34. The panel covers
the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are
populations weighted. Results shown are the same as when having the raw dependent variable. Asterisks
denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Determining the magnitude is slightly more diﬃcult, since the model is estimated in levels
rather than logs, and the homicide rate in California is much larger than in the other two
MML states at the Mexican border. To be more precise, if the juvenile gang homicide rate
in New Mexico and Arizona would decrease by -0.564 as our central estimate suggests, the
homicide rate in this category would turn negative for those states. Hence, we interpret the
magnitude of our coeﬃcients by dividing them by the overall average homicide rate in each
category in California prior to introduction of MML. Using this interpretation, our central
estimate suggests that MML have decreased drug-law related homicides in California by 48
percent, and the juvenile gang homicide rate by 33 percent.
13Regressions using the log of the homicide rate, or 1 plus the log of the homicide rate lead to qualitatively
similar results.
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Both homicides related to narcotic drug laws, and juvenile gang killings are oﬀenses which
are often linked to Mexican DTOs, and gangs aﬃliated to the DTOs. Hence, these results
further corroborate our theory that MML have negatively impacted crime related to DTOs
in Mexican border states. The magnitude of the estimate is surprisingly large, although we
should take into account that the standard error is large as well.
Morris et al. (2014) suggest that the decrease in the homicide rate seen in the UCR data
may have been caused by the fact that users in MML states have substituted marijuana for
alcohol, which in turn decreased the amount of homicides under the inﬂuence of alcohol. We
ﬁnd no evidence for this hypothesis in the supplementary homicide data. Instead the decrease
in homicides is the result of a drop in drug- and gang-related violence.
5.4 STRIDE Results
Table 6 reports the results of MML on drug seizures using the STRIDE data. The dependent
variable in the ﬁrst 4 columns is the log of the quantity seized by the police of, respectively,
powdered cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine and heroine. Columns 5-8 report the log
of the count of seizures. At the Mexican border MML decrease the amount seized for powdered
and crack cocaine, as well as the number of seizures. Seizures outside the Mexican-border
states are unaﬀected by MML, except for the amount of heroin seized which also decreases.
The central estimate indicates that the amount of powdered cocaine seized in states at the
Mexican border have decreased by 85 percent as a result of MML, while the number of seizures
decreased by 35 percent. The amount of crack cocaine seized decreased by 83 percent, while
the number of seizures decreased by 64 percent.
The pattern that emerges from the seizure data of STRIDE appears to be consistent with
our theory that MML have decreased the supply of other drugs, in states at the Mexican
border. The fact that we only ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for cocaine could be due to the fact that
cocaine is the largest drug market after the market for marijuana, and prior to 2009 it was
actually the largest drug market (see Kilmer et al., 2014). As such, cocaine seizures are more
common than seizures for other drugs, and hence, our estimates are more precise for this drug
than for other drugs.
Moreover, DTOs are known to have replaced marijuana plants with poppy plants (Miroﬀ,
2014; UNODC, 2014, e.g.). Hence, we do not expect the supply of this drug to decrease very
much as a result of MML. Finally, methamphetamine has clear alternative supply chains, since
it can also be produced within the US. As such, one would also expect lower complementarity
between the supply of this drug and marijuana.
We caution in interpreting these results. In particular, as discussed in the data section,
STRIDE data is noisy, and likely not representative of drug markets in the US. Indeed, the
magnitude of the point estimates is in our opinion implausibly large and we ﬁnd that the
standard errors are also large, which creates some doubt on the value of the central estimate.
Note that the observed drop in seizures does not appear to be consistent with a theory
where law enforcement agencies shift resources from marijuana to other drugs. In that case we
would expect an increase in other drug seizures, whereas we actually observe a decrease. Thus,
these results may be interpreted as statistical evidence that MML at the Mexican border has
decreased drug traﬃcking of cocaine.
Table 7 reports the estimated eﬀect of MML on the price of drugs as measured by the
STRIDE data, at various distribution levels. As can be seen, MML at the Mexican border
signiﬁcantly increase the price of powdered cocaine at all distribution levels. Eﬀects are again
large, but also very noisy. For the other drugs no pattern arises that is consistent among the
18
Table 6: The Eﬀect of MML on Drugs Seized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantity Count - Seizures
Powder Cocain Crack Cocaine Methamphetamine Heroin Powder Cocaine Crack Cocaine Methampehtamine Heroin
MML Mexico Border -1.865*** -1.548*** -0.140 0.042 -0.418*** -0.988*** -0.085 -0.084
(0.317) (0.495) (0.549) (0.426) (0.110) (0.218) (0.297) (0.221)
MML Rest -0.154 0.338 -0.389 -1.300** -0.337 -0.076 -0.149 -0.105
(0.626) (0.853) (0.562) (0.561) (0.280) (0.123) (0.172) (0.279)
Constant 122.807* -3.098 -172.584 66.002 5.606 9.621 -98.065** 27.380
(69.392) (74.499) (110.438) (123.047) (27.313) (38.463) (43.794) (42.129)
Observations 886 851 780 809 886 851 780 809
R-squared 0.881 0.759 0.790 0.802 0.948 0.909 0.905 0.907
Note: The dependent variable in the ﬁrst 4 columns is the logged quantity seized by the police of the drug reported in the column header, while the dependent variable in the last 4 columns
is the logged count of seizures of these drugs in state s at time t as measured in the STRIDE data. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are
enacted. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time trends. The included
control variables are an indicator for decriminalisation policy, unemployment rate, logged income per capita, the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34.
The panel covers the period 1990-2007. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Results shown are the same as when having
the raw dependent variable. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 7: The Eﬀect of MML on Prices of Drugs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Powder Cocaine Crack Cocaine Methamphetamine Heroin
MML at Mexico border 0.634* 0.742*** 0.156* 0.317*** 0.117 -0.436*** 0.157 -0.123 0.195 0.668 0.020 0.486*** -0.015
(0.326) (0.194) (0.083) (0.079) (0.202) (0.116) (0.148) (0.309) (0.154) (0.423) (0.407) (0.179) (0.160)
MML non border -0.478** 0.231 0.072 0.138 0.347 -0.195 0.025 0.137 -0.106 0.099 -0.375 0.297 0.040
(0.228) (0.552) (0.181) (0.238) (0.466) (0.463) (0.347) (0.433) (0.171) (0.267) (0.436) (0.675) (0.119)
Constant 30.834 16.610 17.756 -12.602 -27.797 26.238 -38.808 54.400 -42.013 -41.761 55.317 -81.923 -39.573
(97.178) (54.024) (17.293) (23.950) (66.895) (33.404) (26.386) (55.602) (36.936) (62.650) (83.238) (60.280) (31.820)
Observations 600 683 789 746 603 724 717 535 573 422 537 576 592
R-squared 0.603 0.541 0.358 0.334 0.581 0.489 0.438 0.509 0.430 0.426 0.343 0.288 0.594
Street Level x x x x
Low Distribution x x x x
High Distribution x
Wholesale x x x x
Note: The dependent variable is the logged price of the drugs purchased, each supercolumn is disaggregated into several distribution levels as outlined in table 2. The distribution level of each column
is marked at the bottom. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state
ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, unemployment rate, logged income
per capita, and the share of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2007. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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distribution levels. Prices in states that are not at the Mexican border are unaﬀected.
The result on powdered cocaine is in line with our hypothesis that MML have decreased
the supply of all illicit drugs in Mexican border states. Such a decrease in supply should lead
to a decrease in quantity traded as well as an increase in the price as we have shown in table
6 and table 7.
We do not obtain equally supportive evidence for our theory from the other drugs. This
could be the result of the quality of the STRIDE data which may be too noisy to pick up these
eﬀects.
5.5 Dynamic Eﬀects
Table 8 shows the dynamic eﬀects of the introduction of MML on crime using UCR data. In
addition to the standard speciﬁcation table 8 include lags of the treatment dummy. This, to
some extent, allows us to determine how long it takes for MML to reduce the crime rate in
Mexican border states. It is important to note that we only include up to two years of lags,
since the ﬁnal treatment at the Mexican border takes place in Arizona in 2010, 2 years before
the end of our data.
As can be seen from the results in column 2 and 3, MML at the Mexican border does
not signiﬁcantly reduce violent crime right after introduction. The negative eﬀect of MML
on crime only becomes signiﬁcant two years after introduction. This lag in the treatment
eﬀect can be easily explained through our theory. If MML reduced the activity of the Mexican
DTOs, it is unlikely that this happened right after the introduction of the law. It takes some
time to set up American marijuana production facilities, such that in the ﬁrst years after the
introduction of MML, most of the marijuana supplied in Mexican-border MML states still
came from Mexico. Moreover, even after US facilities for marijuana production were created
it is unlikely that this led to an immediate retreat of the Mexican DTOs from the American
marijuana market. Finally, in accordance with the literature we coded laws that have been
legalized in the month of December of a given year as occurring in that year, even though
it would be more plausible that their eﬀect is rather referred to the next year. A lag in the
treatment eﬀect is therefore to be expected.
On the other hand, the reduction in property crime appears to happen right after the
introduction of MML in Mexican border states as can be seen in columns 4-6. The lagged
treatment eﬀect is only signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. This sharp immediate eﬀect of
MML is perhaps more diﬃcult to explain than the lagged eﬀect in violent crime, since it is
unlikely that the drug market changed signiﬁcantly in at least the ﬁrst few months after the
introduction of MML. However, as was already emphasized before, our placebo test shown
in the next section places some doubts on the results for property crime, since we cannot
determine whether the estimated treatment coeﬃcient is biased by a violation of the common-
trend assumption.
6 Robustness Analysis
In our robustness analysis we focus on two issues. First, we test whether our results are
correctly measuring the treatment eﬀect of MML, or whether they are biased by diﬀerences in
trends in the outcome variable between treatment and control states. Second, we test whether
the heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀect between Mexican-border states and inland states may
be driven by diﬀerences in the characteristics of the MML, rather than proximity to Mexican
DTOs.
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Table 8: Dynamic Eﬀects of MML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violent Crime Property Crime
MML Mexico Border -0.059*** -0.021 -0.028 -0.134*** -0.095*** -0.101***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) (0.020)
1 year after MML Mexico Border -0.057** -0.017 -0.062* -0.025
(0.028) (0.018) (0.035) (0.020)
2 years after MML Mexico Border -0.054** -0.054*
(0.024) (0.027)
MML Rest 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.050** 0.036* 0.031*
(0.033) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017)
1 year after MML Rest -0.016 -0.008 0.021 0.022
(0.032) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)
2 years after MML Rest -0.013 0.007
(0.030) (0.021)
Constant 9.516* 9.419 8.910 10.413*** 11.798*** 12.524***
(5.308) (5.650) (6.034) (3.733) (4.007) (4.124)
Observations 1,173 1,122 1,071 1,173 1,122 1,071
R-squared 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.974 0.975 0.977
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed
above in state s at time t. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly deﬁned.
The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying the
presented results were all estimated with state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time
trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per
capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers
the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted.
Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Apart from these issues, we have performed several robustness checks for our main results
in table 3, which are reported in the appendix. First, we ran the main regressions with
unweighted, instead of population-weighted OLS. This could potentially inﬂuence the results
at the Mexican border, since the population in California is more than twice as large as the
combined population of the other two MML states at the Mexican border.
Second, we ran the regressions allowing for a diﬀerential treatment eﬀect for each state
that introduced MML at the Mexican Border. This allows us to determine whether the eﬀect
of MML at the Mexican border is driven by a California-speciﬁc eﬀect.
Third, in accordance with the literature, our MML dummy variable takes value 1 for a given
year if MML was introduced in that year. This likely attenuates our estimated treatment eﬀect,
since when MML are introduced in, for example, December 2010, it is unlikely that it has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on anything during 2010. Therefore in a robustness check we round the date
of the MML instead, such that MML introduced in January-June lead to a change in the MML
dummy variable in the same year, while changes in the period July-December lead to a change
in the variable in the next year.
Fourth, we looked into the eﬀect of Mexican law enforcement on crime in the US. In
particular, the election victory of oﬃcials from the Mexican conservative party PAN (National
Action Party) resulted in an increase in law enforcements eﬀorts on prosecuting DTOs (see
e.g. Dell, 2014). If DTO violence in the US has decreased due to the election victory of PAN,
this could bias our estimated treatment eﬀect in Mexican border states downwards. Therefore,
we ran our regressions with a dummy variable for the PAN electoral victory in 2006 interacted
with the Mexican-border dummy.
Fifth, we ran regressions with a separate treatment eﬀect for the Canadian-border region
and a dummy for an announcement at the interior states. Finally, we controlled for spillovers
from neighbor states. In all these exercises, except the diﬀerential treatment eﬀect of Arizona,
MML at the Mexican border had a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on violent crime and our results
remained virtually unchanged. In the regression with diﬀerential treatment eﬀects per state
the indicator for Arizona was of negative sign, but not signiﬁcant, perhaps because Arizona
introduced MML 2 years before the end of the sample period such that there are too few
observations for this state.
6.1 Placebo Test
To perform a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis one must assume that the outcome variable
follows the same trend in treatment and control states, absent of treatment. We test whether
this common-trend assumption is satisﬁed by creating a placebo test where we include the
lead of the MML dummy in our regression. The test works under the following premise.
The announcement eﬀect of MML at the Mexican border are likely negligible. All MML in
Mexican border states were enacted immediately after a public vote, which for each of the three
Mexican border states with MML was a close call. Moreover, even if criminals anticipated the
enactment of MML, it is not clear what kind of diﬀerent behavior they would exhibit during
the announcement period. Therefore, the lead of MML cannot causally decrease the crime
rate. Hence, the lead of the MML variable, in a speciﬁcation which only contains this lead,
should be attenuated with respect to the coeﬃcient in our base regression. Additionally, we
expect that the coeﬃcient on the lead is non-signiﬁcant and close to zero if we include both
the lead and the actual treatment variable.
However, if our results are driven by the fact that the outcome variable follows a diﬀerent
trend in treatment than in control states, the coeﬃcient on the lead of MML are likely of similar
23
magnitude to the coeﬃcient on the actual treatment variable. Additionally, in a speciﬁcation
that contains both the lead and the actual treatment variable, the treatment coeﬃcient should
be much closer to zero in comparison to the base regression, and the lead coeﬃcient should
be of approximately equal magnitude to the coeﬃcient on the actual treatment variable. We
perform this placebo test with two leads of the MML treatment dummy. Table 10 reports the
results.
Column 1 presents the baseline estimate for the eﬀect of MML on violent crime. As can
be seen, in column 2 and 3 the one- and two-year leads of MML at the Mexican border do
not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on violent crime when considered in isolation. As expected, the
coeﬃcient in column 2 is closer to zero than the one in column 1, while the coeﬃcient in
column 3 is almost zero. Column 4 shows a speciﬁcation that contains both leads of MML and
the MML variable itself. In this speciﬁcation, the value of the MML coeﬃcient is virtually
unaﬀected with respect to the base estimate, while the coeﬃcients on the leads of MML at
the Mexican border are close to zero. This provides strong evidence that our result on violent
crime is driven by a treatment eﬀect, rather than by diﬀerences in crime trends between the
treatment and the control states.
The results for property crime are less clear cut. In a speciﬁcation with only the one-year
lead of MML at the Mexican border the coeﬃcient for the lead is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level, as can be seen in column 6. In addition, in the speciﬁcation with both leads and the
actual treatment the coeﬃcient on the one year lead is signiﬁcant, while the actual treatment
eﬀect is smaller than in our base estimates, as can be seen in column 8. This indicates that
any result we derive for the property crime rate must be interpreted with care, since we cannot
exclude the possibility that (part of) our estimate for the treatment coeﬃcient for property
crime is driven by a violation of the common trend assumption.
6.2 Characteristics
We also assess the robustness of our result with respect to the characteristics of diﬀerent
MML. In particular, Alford (2014) shows that MML which allow for dispensaries increase the
violent and property crime rate, while MML which only allow for home cultivation have a non-
signiﬁcant impact on crime. If the diﬀerences in MML correlate with proximity to the Mexican
border, our estimated treatment eﬀect may be biased by the diﬀerence in MML between inland
states and Mexican border states.
To test whether this is the case we create three new dummy variables. The ﬁrst takes
value 1 when MML are introduced. The second takes value 1 the moment a state allows
for home cultivation. The ﬁnal treatment dummy takes value 1 either when a state legalizes
dispensaries or when dispensaries start operating. The treatment eﬀect is again split between
states at the Mexican border, and other states, with the exception of the MML dummy, since
all MML states at the Mexican border immediately allowed for home cultivation. The overall
treatment eﬀect of a state at the Mexican border which allows for both home cultivation and
dispensaries is therefore the sum of the coeﬃcient for home cultivation and dispensaries at the
Mexican border. The overall treatment eﬀect at a state in the interior of the US which allows
for home cultivation and dispensaries is the sum of the coeﬃcients for the respective dummies
for characteristics and the dummy for MML at the interior.
Table 9 presents our results. Column 1 and 3 show the results for each major crime
category when we use the date at which dispensaries were legally allowed at the state level.
This variable was used previously in Pacula et al. (forthcoming) and Alford (2014). With this
dummy we replicate the results by Alford (2014) in the sense that allowing for dispensaries is
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Table 9: The Eﬀect of MML on Crime by MML Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violent Crime Property Crime
Dispensary Legalization Mexico Border -0.024 0.070***
(0.021) (0.016)
Dispensary Legalization Rest 0.070* 0.022
(0.037) (0.042)
Dispensary Operating Mexico Border -0.084*** -0.080**
(0.021) (0.032)
Dispensary Operating Rest 0.031 -0.020
(0.028) (0.016)
Home Cultivation Mexico Border -0.061*** -0.016 -0.133*** -0.092***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019)
Home Cultivation Rest -0.025 -0.095** -0.009 -0.038
(0.043) (0.047) (0.049) (0.038)
MML Rest 0.014 0.077 0.049 0.077**
(0.049) (0.047) (0.053) (0.038)
Constant 8.932 9.916* 11.380*** 11.282***
(5.347) (5.222) (3.644) (3.946)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.980 0.980 0.975 0.974
Note: The dependent variable in the ﬁrst two columns is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000
inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t. The dependent variable in the last two columns
is the log of the property crime rate, similarly deﬁned. The variables are deﬁned as follows: Dispensary
Legalization is a dummy that takes a value one when dispensaries are legalized in state s at time t, separately
for states at the Mexican Border and all the other states. Dispensary Operating is a dummy that takes a
value one when licensed dispensaries are operating regardless of the legal framework in state s at time t,
similarly separated for states at the Mexican border and all the rest. Home Cultivation is a dummy that
takes a value one when home cultivation has been legalized in state s at time t, for Mexico border states
and the rest. MML Rest variable is a dummy which takes value one from the moment MML are enacted in
states not at the Mexican border. An MML variable for Mexican border states is not included because it is
collinear to Home Cultivation at Mexico Border. The regressions underlying the presented results were all
estimated with state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time trends.
The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged
income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the
population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the
state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violent Crime Property Crime
MML at Mexico border -0.059*** -0.055** -0.134*** -0.112***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.039)
1 year before MML Mexico border -0.041 -0.005 -0.115*** -0.041***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.013)
2 years before MML Mexico border -0.023 0.002 -0.075 -0.004
(0.042) (0.032) (0.051) (0.048)
MML Rest 0.010 0.001 0.050** 0.027
(0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.017)
1 year before MML Rest 0.010 -0.006 0.051** 0.004
(0.024) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014)
2 years before MML Rest 0.008 0.012 0.051*** 0.039**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017)
Constant 9.516* 11.279** 12.188** 12.998** 10.413*** 12.114*** 11.219*** 12.827***
(5.308) (5.334) (5.397) (5.341) (3.733) (3.446) (3.235) (3.618)
Observations 1,173 1,122 1,071 1,071 1,173 1,122 1,071 1,071
R-squared 0.980 0.981 0.983 0.983 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.975
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t.
The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly deﬁned. The MML variables are dummies which take value one
from the moment MML are enacted. The variables "1 year before MML" are dummies which take a value one a year before the introduction of MML.
The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time
trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of
males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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positively correlated to violent crime in non-border states, and to property crime in Mexican
border states. Nonetheless, our main result, which shows that MML decrease overall violent
crime in the Mexican border states, remains unaﬀected. To see this note that the overall
treatment eﬀect of MML, the sum of the coeﬃcient of home cultivation and for dispensaries,
is negative at the Mexican border.
When we include the ﬁrst opening of a licensed dispensary, instead of the state-wide al-
lowance of dispensaries, this result disappears. Dispensaries at the Mexican border have a
negative eﬀect on both violent and property crime, and dispensaries in inland states do not
aﬀect the crime rate at all. Additionally, the eﬀect of home cultivation at the Mexican border
on crime becomes smaller, and in the case of violent crime even insigniﬁcant.
This latter result could be seen as giving some indirect evidence for our theory. In par-
ticular, the opening of dispensaries will likely give a far stronger boost to US production of
marijuana than the allowance of home cultivation. As such, Mexican DTOs and their aﬃliated
gangs are likely negatively aﬀected by the opening of licensed dispensaries. Hence, we see a
reduction in crime, in particular, once Mexican border states allow for dispensaries. However,
we should note that identiﬁcation on the eﬀect of dispensaries is rather weak. In particular,
for the three states at the Mexican border, California's ﬁrst licensed dispensary opened one
year after the adoption of MML. For New Mexico and Arizona this occurred two years af-
ter MML were adopted. If we take into account that MML may have a delayed impact on
crime, we cannot be certain whether the estimated coeﬃcient for dispensaries is related to the
dispensaries, or to a delayed eﬀect of the adoption of the MML itself.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we provide indirect evidence for the theory that Medical Marijuana Laws (MML)
decrease crimes committed by Mexican Drug Traﬃcking Organizations (DTOs) in the US. We
exploit a quasi-experimental variation of MML, which were gradually introduced in several
states at diﬀerent points in time. We explore the eﬀect of MML on crime at the Mexican
Border states through the lenses of three diﬀerent datasets. First, we use the Uniform Crime
Reports to ﬁnd the overall eﬀect of MML introduction on crime. We ﬁnd that MML have
signiﬁcantly reduced violent crimes in Mexican border states, most prominent among them,
robberies and homicides. Second, we explore the circumstances under which homicides were
committed through the Supplementary Homicides Reports data. We ﬁnd that the drop in
homicides is driven by a drop in drug law and juvenile gang related homicides, lending support
to the hypothesis that the drop in crime is related to activity in drug markets. Third, we look
at the eﬀect on MML on drug seizures and prices as recorded by the STRIDE dataset. We
observe a drop in the number of seizures as well as the quantity seized for both crack cocaine
and powdered cocaine after MML are introduced in Mexican border states. Moreover, we
observe an increase in the price of powdered cocaine. This provides evidence for a negative
supply shock in illicit drug markets after introduction of MML in Mexican border states.
All these results are consistent with the theory that MML are negatively aﬀecting the large
Mexican DTOs.
The magnitude of each of the identiﬁed eﬀects is surprisingly large. In particular, the gap
in violent crime rates between inland states and border states prior to MML is 20 percent. Our
estimates suggests the introduction of an MML closes this gap by 30 percent, even though MML
only open the door for small-scale production of marijuana. This is consistent with the idea
that marijuana is the "bread and butter" of Mexican DTOs. Although there is some evidence
that DTOs are switching activity to crimes unrelated to drugs such as human traﬃcking, none
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of these activities exhibit the same scale and proﬁt commonly associated with the traﬃcking
of marijuana. Extrapolating from our results, we consider it likely that the full legalization
of marijuana in Colorado and Washington will have an even stronger impact on the DTOs as
large-scale marijuana production facilities are erected in these states.
The case of MML provides an important lesson for policy makers. Drug markets are well-
known for their violence. However, in the case of marijuana when the supply chain of the
drug is legalized, or at least decriminalized, a lot of the violence disappears and the business
of organized crime structures is hurt. In this light, the war on drugs seems counterproductive
in the sense that it has little eﬀect on the availability of marijuana, but large negative eﬀects
on violent crime related to the drug.
An important caveat of this study and other studies on crime is the focus on the property
and violent crime categories reported in UCR, and to drug crimes reported in STRIDE. To
our knowledge, a similar database on crimes such as extortion, human traﬃcking and fraud is
not available. Therefore, our study cannot assert whether these crimes, which are sometimes
associated to activity of Mexican DTOs, are aﬀected by MML. Collecting these crimes in a
nationwide database would provide researchers in (the economics of) crime with an opportunity
to study them in more detail.
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Table A.1: Alternative Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Violent Crime Property Crime
MML Mexico Border -0.059*** -0.076*** -0.224* -0.210** -0.134*** -0.101** -0.182*** -0.154***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.119) (0.094) (0.027) (0.049) (0.060) (0.056)
MML Rest 0.010 -0.036 0.071 0.057 0.010 0.050** 0.041* -0.025 -0.036 0.049**
(0.033) (0.041) (0.053) (0.069) (0.033) (0.023) (0.021) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023)
MML Arizona -0.027 -0.094***
(0.027) (0.022)
MML California -0.066** -0.159***
(0.030) (0.031)
MML New Mexico -0.079*** 0.002
(0.029) (0.020)
Constant 9.516* 8.660 6.495*** 6.143*** 9.590* 10.413*** 9.734*** 8.520*** 8.432*** 11.208***
(5.308) (6.040) (0.086) (0.086) (5.379) (3.733) (3.056) (0.043) (0.033) (3.612)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.980 0.981 0.924 0.924 0.980 0.974 0.968 0.912 0.916 0.974
Control variables x x - - x x x - - x
State speciﬁc trends x x - - x x x - - x
Weighting x - x - x x - x - x
Standard Errors Clustered Clustered Bootstrap Bootstrap Clustered Clustered Clustered Bootstrap Bootstrap Clustered
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t. The dependent
variable in columns 6-10 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly deﬁned. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state ﬁxed eﬀects
and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time trends were used where denotes. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization
policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel
covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Variables: The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The ﬁrst and sixth columns present the preferred speciﬁcation, where
standard errors are clustered at the state level and regressions are populations weighted. The second and seventh columns present unweighted estimates, while the third,
fourth, eighth and ninth column present estimates with bootstrapped standard errors. The ﬁfth and tenth columns disentangle the eﬀect of the MML on each state at the
Mexican Border.
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Table A.2: Other Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violent Crime Property Crime
MML Mexico Border -0.067*** -0.059*** -0.077*** -0.136*** -0.134*** -0.135***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.034)
MML Rest 0.013 0.020 0.050** 0.061***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.023) (0.021)
PAN -0.047 -0.011
(0.030) (0.035)
MML Mexico Border (round up) -0.075*** -0.128***
(0.022) (0.030)
MML Rest (round up) -0.008 0.041*
(0.037) (0.023)
MML Canada Border -0.030 0.015
(0.032) (0.024)
MML Rest less Canada Border 0.046 0.081***
(0.043) (0.024)
Neighbour of MML Mexico Border -0.037 -0.024
(0.024) (0.023)
Neighbour of MML Rest 0.023 0.027
(0.028) (0.020)
Constant 10.023* 8.422 9.749* 9.686* 10.391*** 10.166** 10.616*** 10.310***
(5.275) (5.390) (5.346) (5.151) (3.880) (4.064) (3.707) (3.494)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t.
The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly deﬁned. The regressions underlying the presented results were all
estimated with state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, control variables and state-speciﬁc linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for
decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in
the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted.
Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Variables: The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The variable PAN takes value 1 for states at the
Mexican border after 2006. MML variables with (round up) take a value 1 in the next year of MML if the MML was passed after 30th of June of the same
year. MML Canada Border denotes states that pass an MML law and that are situated at the Canadian border, MML Rest less Canada Border denotes all
the internal states that are not at any border. The variables Neighbour take a value 1 if the neighbour of state s passed MML, it takes a value of 2 when a
second neighbour of state s passes a MML and so on. Neighbour takes a value 0 if state s itself passes a MML.
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